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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, Title VII,
July 2, 1964, 79 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. [Hereinafter cited
as Title VII], is intended to eliminate employment discrimination
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Title VII was
enacted on July 2, 1964 but its substantive provisions did not take
effect until July 2, 1965. Since that time, there have been more than
two hundred published federal court decisions involving private
enforcement actions brought under Title VII.
The single most significant impression one draws from reading the
decisions in Title VII cases is that this area of the law is a procedural
quagmire. The rules are still in the developing stage and the trends of
judicial thought are just beginning to appear as vague forms. Up to this
time, no exhaustive examination of the cases has attempted to mark
the procedural traps that exist or to suggest a safe route for the
practitioner bringing a Title VII action. This study attempts to present
such a guide.
This Comment will not attempt a detailed analysis of all of.the
procedural problems. Rather it will attempt to 1) identify the
procedural problems, 2) refer the reader to every important Title VII
case that has dealt with the problem, and 3) suggest what the trend
seems to be or, if there is none, suggest what the courts might find
persuasive when developing a trend.
This comment is not written primarily to assist the defendant in
a Title VII action. His major difficulty is disproving, substantively, the
allegation of discrimination. Rather, this comment is designed to assist
the charging party whose complaint is often dismissed because of.a
procedural error in pleading, a failure to exhaust remedies or one of a
myriad of other possible mistakes. This comment is written, therefore,
to guide the plaintiffs attorney bringing a Title VII action.
B. Approach
A quick reading of the Table of Contents reveals the broad outline of
this study. First, procedural requirements will be discussed. Since so
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much of the case law deals with federal jurisdiction over the subject
matter, that subject will be discussed first. Then, standing, jurisdiction
over the person, and pleading will be examined. Secondly, this
Comment will examine problems of remedy and some substantive
rights under Title VII that are closely related to procedure. Under this
heading the following will be discussed: court appointment of attorneys
and the award of attorney fees, injunctions in Title VII actions, the
right to a jury trial, and enforcement powers of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Finally, the problem of Title VII as the
exclusive remedy available to the aggrieved party will be explored.
II. PROCEDURAL PREREQUISITES IN BRINING AN ACTION UNDER
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
A. Jurisdictional Prerequisites-Subject Matter
The greatest recurring battle under Title VII has been over the issue
of what prerequisites must be satisfied to give the federal court subject
matter jurisdiction when an aggrieved party attempts to vindicate his
rights under the Act. § 706' is entitled "Enforcement Provisions."
There seems to be little disagreement that § 706(e) requires, as a
prerequisite to bringing a civil action, that the plaintiff (1) exhaust his
administrative remedy under the Act by filing a timely charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter cited as the
EEOC], and (2) file a complaint with the court within thirty days after
receiving notice from the EEOC that they have not been able to
conciliate the problem.2 It is important to understand, what is actually
required by each of these two prerequisites.
I. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES:
a. Administrative remedies-state
The first thing the plaintiff's attorney must do to insure that the
plaintiff files a valid charge with the EEOC is to examine the state law
where the alleged act took place.3 If the plaintiff is in a state which has
a law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice he alleges the
defendant to have committed, a valid EEOC complaint cannot be filed
until the plaintiff first files a charge with the state Fair Employment
Practices Commission (FEPC) if there is one in the state.' This
1. All citations to sections refer to sections of the Statutes at Large under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 unless otherwise indicated.
2. See § 706(a)-(e) and Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969).
3. See § 706(b).
4. See § 706(b) and EEOC v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1968). IBEW Local 5
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requirement is only triggered if the state Fair Employment Practice Act
(FEPA) specifically prohibits the discrimination complained of.5 Where
the state FEPA only prohibits some of the acts allegedly committed
by the defendant, the cases state that the plaintiff must still exhaust his
state FEPC remedy before submitting a charge to the EEOC. For
instance, if a state act prohibits discrimination in hiring but says
nothing about promotions, and the plaintiff alleges discrimination in
both hiring and promotion, he must exhaust his state remedy on the
hiring charge before brining an EEOC charge, alleging discrimination
in both hiring and promotion.' If at the time an EEOC charge is filed,
the state law does not prohibit the acts alleged in the EEOC charge, a
subsequent amendment of the state law to include the alleged act,
although passed while the EEOC charge is pending, does not generate
a requirement that plaintiff file a charge with the state before filing his
civil action.
7
Not only must the plaintiff file a complaint with the state FEPC,
(assuming there is one, and the state law prohibits the alleged act) but
§ 706(b) also requires that the plaintiff allow the state authorities sixty
days to attempt to conciliate the problem, unless the proceedings have
been earlier terminated by the state FEPC. It has been held that
plaintiff must wait sixty days or until the state authorities officially
terminate consideration of the matter whichever is sooner. Plaintiff
may not assume the state authorities have terminated consideration of




If the plaintiff must file a charge with the state first, he must also file
a charge with the EEOC within thirty days from the date of the notice
of the termination of state proceedings or within 210 days from the
date of the alleged unlawful employment practice, whichever is sooner.
v. EEOC. 398 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1968); Watts v. Douglas Aircraft Co., - F. Supp. - , 70
LRRM 2907 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
5. See Cunningham v. Litton Industries, 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969); Crosslin v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. - F. Supp. -. 71 LRRM 2705 (D. Ariz. 1969); Singer v.
Boeing Co.-.. F. Supp..__, 2 FEP Cases 100 (D. Wash. 1969).
6. See Noon v. Kaiser Steel Corp., - F. Supp. . 2 FEP Cases 65 (C.D. Cal. 1969);
Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
7. See Wheeler v. Bohn Aluminum & Brass Co.. - F. Supp. - , 68 LRRM 2762
(W.D. Mich. 1968).




If no state charge need be filed, then the EEOC charge must be filed
within 90 days from the date of the alleged unlawful emoloyment
practice. Failure to satisfy these requirements subjects a subsequent
civil complaint to a dismissal because filing a timely complaint with
the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite."' As simple as this rule may
sound, it has caused a great deal of trouble.
A big problem has been to decide what procedure to follow when
the charging party files a charge initially with the EEOC and the
EEOC refers the charge to the appropriate state agency to satisfy the
requirement of § 706(b). The courts uniformly hold that the EEOC
may not validate the original charge by automatically assuming
jurisdiction of the case upon the expiration of the sixty days from the
date the EEOC referred the charge to the state." The courts do allow
the original charge to be validated after the sixty day state deferral
period has expired, if the charging party writes the EEOC requesting
them to assume jurisdiction. The EEOC charge will be dated as of the
date the EEOC is requested to assume jurisdiction. 2 Clearly if this date
is within 210 days from the date of the alleged unlawful employment
practice, the regenerated EEOC charge satisfies the requirement
of § 706(d).
What if the sixty day state deferral period ends on a date that is
more than 210 days after the alleged act occurred? If the EEOC charge
is viewed as dated as of the request for the EEOC to assume
jurisdiction, it will be dated at a time in excess of 210 days from the
date of the alleged discriminatory act and, therefore, the EEOC charge
will be void under § 706(d).,Only one court has dealt with this
problem directly.'3 It held that when the charging party asks the EEOC
to assume jurisdiction, the request relates back to the date of the
10. See Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.. 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1967): Boudreaux
v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co.. 304 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1969): Singer v. Boeing
Co.. - F. Supp. - 2 FEP Cases 100 (D. Wash. 1969); Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe &
Foundry Co.. - F. Supp. -, 2 FEP Cases 37 (W.D. Va. 1969). One case has held that the
strict time requirements of § 706(d) will not be followed to deny the court jurisdiction if there
are extenuating circumstances that justify the delay. See Antonopulos v. Aerojet-General Corp..
295 F. Supp. 1390 (E.D. Cal. 1968).
II. Love v. Pullman Co.. - F.2d _ 2 FEP Cases 141 (10th Cir. 1969); Washington
v. Aerojet-General Corp., 282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
"12. See Love v. Pullman Co., - F.2d - 2 FEP Cases 141 (10th Cir. 1969); Choate
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968): IBEW Local 5 v. EEOC. 398 F.2d 248
(3rd Cir. 1968); Everett v. Trans-World Airlines, - F. Supp. - 2 FEP Cases 74 (W.D.
Mo. 1969): Marquez v. Sales Office. Ford Motor Co.. - F. Supp. - 2 FEP Cases 26 (D.
Neb. 1968); Wheeler v. Bohn Aluminum & Brass Co.. - F. Supp._. 68 LRRM 2762 (W.D.
Mich. 1968).
13. See Vigil v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.. 305 F. Supp. 44 (D. Colo. 1969).
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original EEOC charge. If the original EEOC charge was made within
210 days from the date of the alleged act, it is valid and federal
jurisdiction over a subsequent civil action is not thereby precluded.
There is one class of violations for which the 90 day rule
of § 706(d) poses no threat, those within the concept of a continuing
violation. Clearly, if the plaintiff can convince the court that the
defendant is engaging in a pattern or practice of discrimination
affecting him, this is a continuing offense and the limitation period
of § 706(d) becomes inapposite." For example, where a collective
bargaining agreement contains provisions that violate the act, the
union's failure to protect its members by not changing the contract has
been held a continuing offense.5 A discriminatory layoff is a
continuing offense as long as recalls are made in violation of the Act. 6
(2) Verified charge
§ 706(a) requires the charge made to the EEOC to be made under
oath. It is clear now that if the charge was unsworn when made, the
defect may be cured by having it sworn to at a later date. The amended
verified complaint will relate back to the date of the original unverified
complaint without prejudice to the charging party.
7
(3) Content of charge
The question of what must be included in a charge has caused the
courts problems in two areas. First, when the charging party sends the
EEOC a letter complaint, is that a "charge?" This question becomes
critical if the 90 days allowed to file a "charge" with the EEOC have
passed. The trend of thought is that the substantive requirements for a
sufficient lay-initiated charge should be liberally construed. The courts
follow the EEOC regulation 1601.11(b) which provides that to be a
"charge," a letter need only inform the EEOC generally "what the
14. See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co.. - F.2d - , 2 FEP Cases 377 (5th Cir.
1970): Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co. - F. Supp. _. 2 FEP Cases 398 (D. Maine 1970):
Motorola, Inc. v. EEOC - F. Supp. _- 2 FEP Cases 407 (D. Ariz. 1969).
15. See Moreman v. Georgia Power Co.. - F. Supp. _. 70 LRRM 3112 (N.D. Ga.
1969).
16. See Cox v. United States Gypsum Co.. 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969).
17. See Blue Bell Boots. Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, (6th Cir. 1969): Weeks v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969): Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462
(5th Cir. 1969); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.. 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968): Grimm v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.. 300 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Roberson v. Great American
Ins. Cos., - F. Supp. - 71 LRRM 2706 (N.D. Ga. 1969): Marquez v. Sales Office, Ford
Motor Co.. - F. Supp. -, 2 FEP Cases 26 (D. Neb. 1968): King v. Georgia Power Co..
295 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968): Wheeler v. Bohn Aluminum & Brass Co.. F. Supp.
68 LRRM 2762 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
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grievance is all about.""' The Sixth Circuit has recently extended this
principle and has authorized the EEOC to reframe the charges to
articulate adequately the lay complainant's allegations before serving
the charges on the defendant.19 It is fair to say that the courts generally
take the position that since the charges to the EEOC are lay-initiated,
the charging party should be allowed to amend his charge liberally
without prejudice to conform with the requirements of the statute.
Requiring that his charge conform initially to a set of procedural
niceties would defeat the purpose of the Act.2'
A second area where the content of the charge has been important
is when the EEOC makes a demand for evidence under the
investigatory powers granted t6 it by § 710(a). The right to investigate
and make enforceable demands for evidence is conditioned on the filing
of a valid charge by either a private party or by one of the five
commissioners of the EEOC under § 706(c). Three cases have dealt
with the question of what specificity is required in a charge filed by an
EEOC Commissioner to trigger the EEOC's general investigatory
powers. Two district courts2 have held that a general charge of
discrimination is insufficient. The charge must allege facts sufficient to
demonstrate that the- charging party is in possession of information
which he believes to have basis in fact, and which, therefore, forms a
basis for initiating the charge. These courts have held that the
legislative history conclusively demonstrates that Congress intended
that the EEOC not have the power to investigate simply because of
official suspicion or curiosity. Another district court'22 has held that the
conmissioner may generally allege that a particular defendant is
engaging in a pattern or practice of discrimination without alleging any
facts which tend to prove the existence of this pattern or practice. This
court held that such a general allegation was a "'valid charge" and was
18. See Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC. 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969): Jenkins v. United Gas
Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); Madlock v. Sardis Luggage Co.. 302 F. Supp. 866 (N.D.
Miss. 1969).
19. Blue Bell Boots. Inc. v. EEOC,418 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969).
20. See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969): Choate v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968), Logan v. General Fireproofing Co..
F. Supp. -, 2 FEP Cases 107 (W.D. N.C. 1969); Madlock v. Sardis Luggage Co.. 302 F.
Supp. 866 (N.D. Miss. 1969): King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968):
Marquez v. Sales Office, Ford Motor Co., - F. Supp. _ 2 FEP Cases 26 (D. Neb. 1968):
Wheeler v. Bohn Aluminum & Brass Co.. - F. Supp. _. 68 LRRM 2762 (W.D. Mich.
1968).
21. Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, - F. Supp. _. 2 FEP Cases 204 (D. S.C. 1969):
Bowaters Southern Paper Corp. v. EEOC. 304 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
22. Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 303 F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
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therefore sufficient to give the EEOC jurisdiction to conduct a general
investigation of the defendant's employment practices and procedures.
c. Contractual remedies
Most collective bargaining contracts today have-provisions for
grievance machinery. The courts have been asked many times whether
an employee must exhaust this remedy under the collective bargaining
agreement as a condition precedent to vindicating a stattitory right to
equal employment opportunity.
Courts have held that an employee must exhaust his contract
remedy before proceeding either under the Railroad Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1964): or § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).-" They have uniformly held
that there is no requirement that the plaintiff exhaust his contract
remedy before proceeding under Title VII 
1
25
d. Election of remedies and n7ootness
As will be demonstrated, many Title VII plaintiffs have had civil suits
dismissed because the court has found that the plaintiff has made a
binding election of remedy other than Title VII, or that the case is
moot because of events that transpired subsequent to the alleged
unlawful employment practice.
The easiest way to approach this problem is, perhaps, to delineate
acts by the plaintiff that all courts have agreed do not constitute a
binding election of remedies. As would seem apparent from the above
discussion of exhausting state Fair Employment Practice remedies (as
is required by § 706(b)), filing a charge with the state is not a binding
election of remedy. This was expressly held in Marquez v. Sales Ojice,
Ford Motor Co.2 6 Settlement agreements between the EEOC and the
charged party that are unacceptable to the charging party are not
binding on him and do not preclude his bringing a civil action.27 Nor
is the charging party in any way affected by settlement agreements
made by members of a class on whose behalf he may be suing.
"
23. Foy v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 377 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1967).
24. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox. 379 U.S. 650 (1965); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 301 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. III. 1969).
25. Moreman v. Georgia Power Co.. - F. Supp.-, 70 LRRM 3112 (N.D. Ga. 1969);
King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Washington v. Aerojet-General
Corp., 282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Reese v. Atlantic Steel Co., 282 F. Supp. 905 (N.D.
Ga. 1967).
26. - F. Supp. -, 2 FEP Cases 26 (D. Neb. 1968).
27. Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969).
28. Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 46 F.R.D. 442 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
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Some courts have been troubled by the following situation. The
plaintiff brings a class action alleging that he has been discriminated
against by defendant employer and sues for an injunction on behalf of
himself and those similarly situated. While the federal civil action is
pending, the employer grants the plaintiff the affirmative relief he
seeks, i.e. grants the promotion, hires the plaintiff, etc. The issue then
becomes, since the plaintiff no longer has standing to sue on his own
behalf, is the class action moot for the entire class? The two cases
which have discussed the problem29 have held that the plaintiff may
continue the class action. Although the specific act of discrimination
has been relieved by the settlement, the plaintiff may continue the suit
on behalf of himself and the class and seek to enjoin the defendant from
continuing the unlawful pattern or practice if he can prove a pattern
or practice of discrimination.
In other election of remedy situations, the courts are in substantial
disagreement.
Has the plaintiff made a binding election of remedies by utilizing
a collective bargaining grievance procedure that is available to him,
before attempting to proceed under Title VII? There seems to be no
question that if the plaintiff only filed a grievance, but, before any
determination was made, decided not to continue to proceed under the
grievance procedure, his initial filing, of itself, does not constitute a
binding election remedy.*"' The cases are in conflict as to whether, when
the plaintiff files a grievance and prosecutes it to completion, this
constitutes a binding election of remedy and precludes federal court
jurisdiction. In Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., the court held:
[P]ilaintiff (alleging discriminatory discharge) elected his remedy by proceeding
under the union contract grievance procedure. He did not wait for the
determination of his grievance arbitration before filing his charge with the
EEOC, but he received his specific remedy under the Act by reinstatement and
back pay through the arbitration award, which preceded the filing of this suit.
We believe that this would be a bar to any cause of action based on the
dismissal.3'
Other cases have taken the same position, that pursuing the
grievance procedure to completion bars federal jurisdiction over the
matter in controversy.
32
29. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); Logan v. General
Fireproofing Co.. - F. Supp. -, 2 FEP Cases 107, (W.D. N.C. 1969).
30. Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co.. - F. Supp. -. 2 FEP Cases 37
(W.D. Va. 1969).
31. - F. Supp.. . 2 FEP Cases 104, 105 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
32. Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968);
Washington v. Aerojet-General Corp., 282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal 1968).
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Two cases have held that pursuit of a remedy under the grievance
machinery does not preclude court jurisdiction over the same matter.
In Deive" v. Reynolds Metals Co.:,:  the plaintiff pursued her grievance
to arbitration and lost. When plaintiff filed a civil court action under
Title VII, the court noted that the doctrine of election of remedies has
traditionally been applied to cases where the same or nearly identical
issues were being pursued in two fora. It went on to reason that when
the arbitrator, being a "creature of the contract", hears a case, he
considers the rights and duties created by the contract, but a Title VII
court is limited to the provisions of Title VII. The issues and remedies
involved, therefore, differ substantially. The court held that the
arbitration award should not predlude the court's jurisdiction.
Recently the 7th Circuit affirmed the reasoning of Dewel" in Bowe
v. Colgate-Palnolive Co.:, Here the court said that the plaintiff could
pursue both remedies simultaneously. He is not required to make a
binding election of remedies until after adjudication. The court held:
[W]e hold that it was error not to permit the plaintiffs to utilize dual or parallel
prosecution both in court and through arbitration so long as election of remedy
was made after adjudication so as to preclude duplicate relief which would result
in an unjust enrichment or windfall to the plaintiffs05
It would be incorrect, however, to say there is a trend in the cases
considering the issue of election of remedies when the arbitration
machinery is used to completion. The problem is created by a conflict
of policies. One policy is to promote the use of grievance machinery
but not to allow its use to defeat the grievant's statutory rights under
Title VII. The other policy goal is not to require the defendant to
defend, in two fora, essentially the same allegations. The Dewey Court
stated the position of the liberal courts very well. It said:
When rights of this type are involved, the right to equal employment opportunity
outweighs the interest of the company-defendant in avoiding the inconvenience
and expense of multiple actions. 6
2. THE CIVIL COMPLAINT MUST BE TIMELY FILED
As has been stated supra, there are two basic prerequisites that must
be satisfied before a civil action under Title VII can be brought. (1)
The plaintiff must exhaust certain remedies. This has been discussed in
33. 291 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
34. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
35. Id. at 715.
36. 291 F. Supp. at 789.
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Section 1. (2) The civil action must be timely filed. The latter
prerequisite will be discussed in Section 2.
§ 706(e) states:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission ...... .such
period may be extended to not more than sixty days upon a determination by
the Commission that further efforts to secure voluntary compliance are
warranted), the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance
with this Title, the Commission shall so notify the aggrieved and a civil action
may, within thirty days thereafter, be brought against the respondent named in
the charge ....
A great many problems have arisen under § 706(e); it poses a
substantial threat to the unwary. 1t was originally thought that an
attempt by the EEOC to conciliate the charge was a jurisdictional
prerequisite to brining a civil action. Read literally, the language
of § 706(e) reasonably leads one to this conclusion. But, the courts
now agree that the plaintiff need only file a charge" with the EEOC,
thus giving the EEOC the opportunity" to conciliate. If the EEOC
makes no effort to conciliate, the plaintiff is in no way prejudiced.
3 7
The plaintiff is required to get official notification from the EEOC
that it either has had jurisdiction over the case for sixty days and has
been unable to conciliate or that it has terminated its attempt to
conciliate. Just as the state notification of termination of jurisdiction
must be official,'8 so also the EEOC "60 day letter" is the required
official form of notification. If the plaintiff files a civil action before
receiving official notification from the EEOC that it has not been able
to conciliate the problem, the complaint will be dismissed."
As has been mentioned, the EEOC charge must be filed within 90
days from the date of the alleged act of discrimination unless the state
FEPC must first be contacted (in which event the plaintiff has 210 days
to file his EEOC charge). The question has arisen in many cases
whether the plaintiff is required to file his court action within 90 days
from the date that he files his charge with the EEOC-60 days delay
for EEOC action and 30 days thereafter to file the complaint4  The
37. See Cunningham v. Litton Industries. 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969): Miller v. Int'l
Paper Co.. 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969): Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry.. 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969):
Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R.. 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968): Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co.. 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968): Carr v. Conoco Plastics. Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Miss.
1969). aljd per curiam - F. 2d _, 2 FEP Cases 388 (5th Cir. 1970): Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc.. 271 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Va. 1967).
38. See authority cited supra note 8.
39. See Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969).
40. Section 706(e) allows the EEOC sixty days to conciliate the claim. The argument made
to the courts was that sixty days was the maximum amount of time allowed to the EEOC under
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clear trend of judicial thought is that the Act imposes no mandatory
period upon the EEOC in which it must act."' Rather, § 706(e) has
been interpreted to mean that the EEOC may take as much time as is
necessary to conciliate the claim, but if the charging party desires, he
may initiate a civil action after deferring to the EEOC for a minimum
of sixty days. Anytime after sixty days has elapsed, the charging party
may demand a "60 day letter" from the EEOC as official verification
that the EEOC has had an opportunity for sixty days to conciliate the
dispute and has been unsuccessful. The plaintiff's thirty days to file a
civil suit begins to run, not at the end of sixty days from the filing of
the EEOC charge, but rather, from the receipt of the "60 day letter.142
If the plaintiff chooses to petition the court for appointment of
counsel under § 706(e), he may preserve his right to file a civil suit
without filing a complaint during the thirty days after receipt of the
EEOC "60 day letter", if he files his petition for appointment of
counsel within thirty days.13 Otherwise the 30 day requirement is
satisfied if the civil complaint is filed with the Clerk of the Court within
thirty days pursuant to Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.44
The effect of the EEOC not finding probable cause to believe the
respondent named in the charge committed the alleged unlawful
the statute. Therefore, the thirty days allowed the plaintiff to file his civil action begins to run
sixty days after he files a valid complaint with the EEOC.
41. Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969); Miller v. Int'l Paper Co..
408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson
v. Seaboard Air Line R.R.. 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402
F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968); IBEW Local 5 v. EEOC. 398 F.2d 248 (3rd Cir. 1968); EEOC v.
Plumbers Local 189, - F. Supp. - 2 FEP Cases 170 (S.D. Ohio 1969): Aiken v. New
York Times, - F. Supp.._', 2 FEP Cases 64 (S.D. N.Y. 1969); Everett v. Trans-World
Airlines, - F. Supp. _ 2 FEP Cases 74 (W.D. Mo. 1969); Barron v. Neco Elec. Products
Corp., - F. Supp. - , 70 LRRM 3194 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe &
Foundry Co., - F. Supp. -, 2 FEfP Cases 37 (W.D. Va. 1969); Carr v. Conoco Plastics.
Inc.. 295 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Miss. 1969); aff d per curiam - F.2d _ 2 FEP Cases 388
(5th Cir. 1970); Pullen v. Otis Elevator Co.. 292 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
42. It was held in Grimm v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.. 300 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1969)
that if after the charging party receives notification that the EEOC has found that there is no
probable cause to believe an unfair employment practice has been committed, he petitions the
EEOC to reconsider its adverse finding, the thirty day limitation period will not begin to run until
the charging party receivesfinal notification of the EEOC's ruling.
43. See McQueen v. E.M.C. Plastic Co., 302 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Tex. 1969); Witherspoon
v. Mercury Freight Lines, - F. Supp. - , 70 LRRM 2913 (S.D. Ala. 1968). Cf. Davis v.
Boeing Co., - F. Supp. - , 2 FEP Cases 62 (W.D. Wash. 1969) refused to follow this
precedent when the EEOC found no probable cause to believe an unfair employment practice had
been committed.




employment practice has generated much confusion and many
conflicting district court decisions. It is now clear that, if after sixty
days the EEOC has made no determination of the existence of probable
cause, the charging party's rights are in no way affected. Federal
jurisdiction does not depend on an EEOC finding of probable cause.
5
When the EEOC finds there is no probable cause, the district courts
have taken conflicting positions, some holding that such a finding
precludes the district court from taking jurisdiction" and some
accepting jurisdiction notwithstanding the adverse finding by the
EEOC. 47
Courts holding that an EEOC finding ot no probable cause
precludes thgcourt from assuming jurisdiction reason as follows:
§ 706(e) conditions jurisdiction on an EEOC notification to the
charging party of its inability to obtain voluntary compliance with the
Act. Clearly when a claim is frivolous, the EEOC cannot seek to have
the respondent named in the charge voluntarily comply with the Act
and certainly will not be able to notify the charging party that the
EEOC has been unable to effect voluntary compliance. Therefore, the
jurisdictional prerequisite of § 706(e), these courts conclude, has not
been satisfied.
The courts which accept jurisdictionf notwithstanding an adverse
finding by the-- EEOC reason that the EEOC's decision should not be
binding on the court for three reasons: (1) The Act does not command
such a result. § 706(e) conditions court jurisdiction on notification by
the EEOC of its. inability to conciliate the dispute. This means inability
for any reason, including the failure to attempt conciliation." (2) The
legislative history of the Act does not command that-the court be
45. See cases cited in supra note 37 and Holliday Y. Railway Express Co. - F. Supp.
2 FEP Cases 279 N.D. Ga. 1969): EEOC v. Plumbers Local 189. - F. Supp. _. 2
FEP Cases 170 (S.D. Ohio 1969) and cases cited therein. Contra. Chavez v. Rust Tractor Co.
_F. Supp. _, 2 FEPCases 339 (D. N.M. 1969)...
46. Fekete v. United States Corp.. - F. Supp. -. 2 FEP Cases 104 (W.D. Pa. 1969):
Flowers v. Local 6, Laborers. __ F. Supp. - , 2 F P Cases 235 (N.D. Ill. 1969): Davis v.
Boeing Co., - F. Supp. _ 2 FEP Cases 62 (WD. Wash. 1969): Green v. McDonnell-
Douglas Corp.. 299 F. Supp. 1100. (E.D. Mo. 1969).
47. McDonald v. Musicians - F. Supp. _. 2 FEP Cases 365 (N.D. III. 1970): Brown
v. Frontier Airlines. Inc., 305 F. Supp. 827 (D. Colo. 1969). Grimm v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp..
300 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1969): Aiken v. New York flimes, - F. Supp. - , 2 FEP Cases
64 (S.D. N.Y. 1969): Walker v. Keathley's. Inc. - F.. Supp. -. 2 FEP Cases 375 (W.D.
Tenn. 1969). Ross v. Continental Tel. Service Corp. - F. Supp. _. 2 FEP Cases 356 (D.
N.M: 1969).
48. The cases cited at note 37 supra are instructive on this point. There the court held that
if no conciliation is'attempted the charging party's rights are not prejudiced. The act only requires
an opportunity for voluntary compliance not a showing of efforts directed toward conciliations.
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bound by an adverse EEOC ruling. The legislative history is
inconclusive and gives little guidance. (3) Most importantly, the
underlying policy of the Act commands that the charging party not be.
prejudiced by any action or inaction of the EEOC. The underlying
premise of the enforcement policy of Title VII is that Title VII rights
shall be ultimately enforced by private individuals, and the courts shall
be the exclusive source of enforcement power. Therefore, the courts
reason that to allow an EEOC finding to affect the substantive rights
of the charging party would certainly give efficacy to a theory of
administrative enforcement which is contrary to the above-stated
policy.
The courts protect charging parties from being prejudiced by
EEOC incompetence in many ways. As has been stated several times,
the charging party is not penalized if the EEOC makes no attempt to
conciliate.511 The charging party is not bound by an EEOC conciliation
agreement unacceptable to him.51 One court has overturned EEOC
guidelines which depart from Title. VII policy.52 It would be
inconsistent to preclude these EEOC rulings and findings from being
binding on the court but to allow an EEOC finding of no probable
cause to have the effect of completely destroying the charging party's
substantive right to sue in federal court.
As there have been no Circuit Court decisions on the issue of the
effect to be given an EEOC finding of no probable cause, and since
the six district court cases that have ruled on the issue have split evenly,
it is difficult to predict what rule will be accepted. The plaintiff's
lawyer confronted with the problem should realize that the 4th, 5th, 7th
and 9th Circuits have all taken the position when dealing in similar
problems that EEOC acts or omissions should not be allowed to
determine substantive rights of the accused.;: Courts in these circuits,
at least, should be persuaded by the argument that the Title VII policy
of private enforcement requires judicial determination of probable
cause and an administrative determination is not binding.
49. See Miller v. Int'l Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
50. See cases cited note 37 supra.
51. Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969).
52. American Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. Alexander. 294 F. Supp. 1100 (D. D.C. 1968).
53. There is a' recurring theme in the cases that the charging party's substantive rights
should not be affected by EEOC action or omission. See. e.g.. Cunningham v. Litton Indus.. 413
F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969); Miller v. Int'l Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969): Choate v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d
28 (5th Cir. 1968); Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968): Carr v.
Conoco Plastics. Inc.. 295 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Miss. 1969). af/'d per curiam - F.2d _ 2
FEP Cases 388 (5th Cir. 1970); Noon v. Kaiser Steel Corp., - F. Supp. - , 2 FEP Cases
65 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Sokolowski v. Swift & Co., 286 F. Supp. 775 (D. Minn. 1968).
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The issue of whether a federal court is precluded from hearing
allegations under Title VII because of a prior determin~ation has arisen
in two other contexts. In Norman v. Missouri Pac. R.R.?' the court
held that a Black porter may utilize Title VII to vindicate alleged acts
of employment discrimination, even though the same issue was
previously decided adversely in an administrative procedure under the
Railroad Labor Act. In Stebbins v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co?" the court held that the doctrine of res judicata precluded
plantiff from litigating a Title VII action because, in a prior action
brought under Title VII, the court had dismissed the plaintiff's
identical case under Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(failure to comply with an order of the court). The court held that the
dismissal of the plaintiff's prior action under Rule 41(b) was res
judicata because the procedural rule is that such a dismissal is to be
viewed as an adjudication of the case on the merits.
B. Other Procedural Hurdles
I. STANDING
a. Labor unions as "persons aggrieved"
One of the first procedural questions to face the courts was the question
of whether a union could be a "person aggrieved" and join individual
members of the union in bringing a suit on behalf of all of the union
members in a class-type action under Title VII. In an early case, 56 one
court held that a union could be a "person aggrieved" and join as a
plaintiff on behalf of all union members. Other courts followed this
lead57 and today it is fair to say that there can be little question that
the rule is that unions may be "persons aggrieved" and may sue on
behalf of all members of the union.
b. Class actions
The practice of bringing a class action in Title VII cases was not
anticipated by the statute, but has been authorized by the courts. 8 In
Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,59 the question was whether four
54. 414 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1969).
55. 413 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
56. Int'l Chemical Workers Union v. Planters Mfg. Co.. 259 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Miss.
1966).
57. Rosen v. Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 409 F.2d 775 (3rd Cir. 1969). Local 186.
Paper Workers v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., - F. Supp. -, 71 LRRM 2427 (N.D. Ind.
1969).
58. See Grimm v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 300 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
59. 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
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Black plaintiffs could file a suit seeking injunctive relief against a
corporation and two local unions on behalf of themselves and all
present and prospective Black employees as a class. The defendants
argued that according to the Act, only persons who had filed charges
with the EEOC were permissible plaintiffs. The court disagreed,
however, finding it wasteful to require numerous employees, all with
the same grievance, to file identical charges for EEOC investigation
and conciliation. The court noted that discrimination is by definition
directed against a class. What would be found true of one charge would
be true of the others; no reason would exist for different results from
conciliation attempts on any of the charges. The court thus held that
a class action, complying with the requirements of Rule 23(a),(b)(2),
may be brought on charges previously filed, with the EEOC, by one
plaintiff. The holding in Oatis. supra, that a class action may be
maintained on behalf of an individual who has exhausted remedies and
also on behalf of others similarly situated who have not exhausted such
remedies, when the remedy sought is solely a prohibitive injunction, has
been followed in many other cases."' What is less certain today is the
extent to which, if it may do so at all, a court may fashion such
individual remedies as reinstatement and award for back wages for
unnamed members of the class who were not specifically the subjects
of the charge filed with the EEOC and have not exhausted their
administrative remedies.
Many courts have developed what has become a jurisdictional
limitation when non-exhausting class members seek the remedies of
reinstatement or back pay. As the court in Hall v. Werthan Bag
Corp." stated
In regard to the injunctive relief sought in this case, .... the purpose of the
requirement of resort to the Commission has already been served. In regard to
whatever back pay or reinstatement which might be sought as ancillary relief,
however, the purpose of the administrative remedies requirement has been
satisfied only as to Robert Hall [the employee who had filed with the
Commission], for the Commission had not attempted conciliation in regard to
60. See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., - F.2d -, 2 FEP Cases 377 (5th Cir.
1970): Miller v. Int'l Paper Co.. 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969): Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400
F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968): Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.. 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968): Williams
v. American Saint Gobain Corp.. - F. Supp. _. 70 LRRM 2325 (E.D. Okla. 1969):
Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co.. - F. Supp. -, 2 FEP Cases 37 (W.D. Va.
1969). Grimm v. Westinghouse Elect. Corp.. - F. Supp. -, 2 FEP Cases 156 (N.D. Cal.
1969); Dobbins v. Local 212. IBEW. 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1969): King v. Georgia Power
Co.. 295 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968): Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 271 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.
N.C. 1967): Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp.. 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
61. 251 F. Supp. 184(M.D. Tenn. 1966).
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rectifying any alleged injuries which other Negro employees . . . may claim to
have suffered as a result of the defendant's alleged discrimination 2
The rationale that the EEOC should be accorded an opportunity
to conciliate each individual class member's charge prior to an action
for reinstatement and back wages, even though such conciliation is held
unnecessary as a prerequisite to the remedy of an injunction, has been
followed by several other courts. 3 These cases in effect make a
distinction between remedying the existence of a discriminatory policy
wherein injunctions will apply without the necessity of total class
exhaustion and the effects of such discrimination, wherein the
individual remedies of reinstatement and back pay may be granted only
to exhausting class members.
Other cases have allowed non-exhausting members of the class to
be awarded affirmative relief. Some require the person to be before the
court at ledst, as an intervening plaintiff 4 while others allow non-
exhausting members of the class who are not before the court to be
awarded back pay, reinstatement or other affirmative relief65 These
courts seem to beinfluenced by the arguments that (1) the EEOC has
had a chance to conciliate since the composition of the class is limited
to members similarly situated with the plaintiff who has exhausted his
EEOC remedy," (2) the courts in Title VII actions have a
responsibility to be flexible and model their decrees to ensure
compliance with the Act, 7 and (3) such a result is necessary because
the public interest is vindicated through private litigation and this
interest is served as much by relief through awards of back wages and
62. Id., at 188.
63. Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969); Burney v. North
American Rockwell Corp., 302 F. Supp. 86 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Williams v. American Saint Gobain
Corp., - F. Supp. -, 70 LRRM 2325 (E.D. Okla. 1969); Kemp v. General Elec. Co., -
F. Supp. -. , 71 LRRM 2020 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Moreman v. Georgia Power Co.,. F. Supp.
_. 70 LRRM 3112 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (dictum); King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943
(N.D. Ga. 1968).
64. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); Boudreaux v. Baton
Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 304 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1969); Madlock v. Sardis Luggage
Co., 302 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Antonopulos v. Aerojet-General Corp., 295 F. Supp.
1390 (E.D. Cal. 1968); Freese v. John Morrell & Co., - F. Supp. -, 70 LRRM 2924 (S.D.
Iowa 1966).
65. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Rosen v. Public Service
Elec. & Gas Co., 409 F.2d 775 (3rd Cir. 1969); Local 186, Paper Workers v. Minn. Mining &
Mfg. Co., - F. Supp. - , 71 LRRM 2427 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar
Refining, 46 FRD 56 (S.D. Ga. 1968); Quarles v. Philip Morris,. Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D.
Va. 1968).
66. Local 186, Paper Workers v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co, - F. Supp. - , 71
LRRM 2427, 2434 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
67. Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
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reinstatement to obscure class members as by issuance of an
injunction.6
The issue of the appropriate remedy for non-exhausting members
of the class is still not conclusively decided. A basic conflict exists here,
as it does in other areas under Title VII, between whether emphasis on
voluntary compliance or emphasis on involuntary court orders is the
procedure possessing the most promise in fulfilling the objectives of the
Act. The first judicial battle occurred over the requirement of EEOC
conciliation. Supporters of court enforcement won as set forth supra.
To the extent that that battle indicates a trend, one could fairly predict
that non-exhausting class members will be allowed affirmative relief in
the future. Furthermore the above-stated three arguments will be
among those found persuasive by the courts.
Another problem the class action has unveiled is the proper
composition of the class for which the plaintiff is a fair representative.
Here again the courts are in disagreement. Some courts hold that the
plaintiff may represent only those who have claims identical to his. 9
Other courts permit a broader definition of the class. The courts hold
that the plaintiff may represent all persons having claims reasonably
related to the issues generated by the plaintiffs charge.7 " This theory
is particularly significant since it has also been held that the issues
generated by plaintiffs charge are not only those acts of discrimination
which are directly injurious to him, but also those acts that will
68. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969): Local 186, Paper
Workers v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., F. Supp. _. - 71 LRRM 2427. 2435 (N.D.
Ind. 1969). See also Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400. 401-02 (1968):
Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.. 400 F.2d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1968).
69. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp. 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968): Roberson v. Great
American Ins. Cos.. - F. Supp. _ 71 LRRM 2706 (N.D. Ga. 1969): Burney v. North
American Rockwell Corp.. 302 F. Supp. 86 (C.D. Cal. 1969): Kemp v. General Elec. Co.. -
F. Supp. _ 71 LRRM 2020 (N.D. Ga. 1969): Chavez v. Rust Tractor Co.. F. Supp.
-. 2 FEP Cases 339 (D. N.M. 1969): Graniteville Co. v. EEOC. F. Supp. - , 2 FEP Cases
204 (D. S.C. 1969): King v. Georgia Power Co.. _95 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968): Black v.
Central Motor Lines. Inc.. - F. Supp. _ 70 LRRM 2325 (W.D. N.C. 1968): Colbert v.
H-K Corp.. 295 F. Supp..1091 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
70. Griggs v. Duke Power Co. - F.2d _. 2 FEP Cases 310 (4th Cir. 1970); Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express. Inc. 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969); Jenkins v. United Gas Co. RR.
400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968): Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co. - F. Supp. - 2 FEP Cases
398 (D. Maine 1970): Wilson v. Monsanto Co., - F. Supp. - , 2 FEP Cases 370 (E.D.
La. 1970): Logan v. General Fireproofing Co.._ F. Supp. _- 2 FEPCases 107 (W.D. N.C.
1969): Clark v. American Marine Corp.. 304 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1969): Madlock v. Sardis
Luggage Co.. 302 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Miss. 1969): Ry. Employees v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
F. Supp. _. 2 FEP Cases 184 (N.D. Ill. 1969): Lea v. Cone Mills Corp.. 301 F. Supp. 97
(M.D. N.C. 1969): Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 46 FRD 56 (S.D. Ga. 1968): Banks
v. Lockheed-Georgia Co.. 46 FRD 442 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp.. 251 F.
Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
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potentially affect him.7 ' The class- is defined as all those who have
claims reasonably related to the issues generated by plaintiff's
complant. The issues generated by plaintiff's complaint are seen as all
acts of discrimination which will potentially affect the plaintiff, thus
broadly defining the scope of the issue generated by plaintiff's
complaint. One can readily see that these two holdings, taken together,
will have the effect of allowing the class to be broadly defined.
All that can be stated in the way of summary is that the district
courts are in conflict. The only circuit which has taken a position is
the 5th Circuit. Even the four 5th Circuit cases on point conflict, but
it is now becoming clear that the 5th Circuit will broadly define the
permissible composition of the class. Further definitive analysis of the
judicial trend on this issue must necessarily await subsequent decisions
from the other Circuits.
2. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
a. Service of the EEOC charge upon the respondent
§ 706(a) directs the EEOC to serve a copy of the charge on the
respondent named in the charge and to attempt thereafter conciliation
if probable cause is found. As has been noted supra, the courts had to
decide whether conciliation attempts by the EEOC were prerequisites
for federal court jurisdiction. Now it is clear that they are not.
Similarly, the courts have had to decide whether service of the-charge
on the respondent is a jurisdictional requirement to bringing an action
in federal court. Although some cases have dismissed private action
brought pursuant to § 706(d) when the defendant has never been
served with a copy of the charge by the EEOC,72 there is authority that
the EEOC's failure to serve a copy of the charge in no way affects the
plaintiff's right to bring a private action after the plaintiff has waited
the required 60 days. 73 So few cases have been decided on the subject
that no indication of a trend of judicial thought appears. The plaintiffs
attorney should remember, however, the argument used in the cases on
EEOC failure to attempt conciliation and EEOC finding of no
probable cause, viz., that the EEOC inaction should not affect the
rights of the charging party.7 The only clear position most of the
71. See, e.g., Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Miss. 1969). affd
per curiam - F. 2d -, 2 FEP Cases 388 (5th Cir. 1970).
72. Long v. Georgia Kraft Co.,- F. Supp._. 71 LRRM 2018 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
73. Spell v. Local 77, IATSE, F. Supp...., 71 LRRM 2811, (D. N.J. 1969).
74. Courts have stated in other contexts that there are only two jurisdicational prerequisites
to bringing a federal suit. 1) Filing a timely complaint with the EEOC and 2) Receiving official
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courts have taken is that if the EEOC is required to serve a copy of
the charge on the respondent in order to create an opportunity to
conciliate, there is no statutory time limit in which they must act.
75
Since the charging party clearly has the right to demand a "60 day
letter" 60 days after he has filed with the EEOC, 76 and since the EEOC
is nor required to serve a copy of the charge on the respondent within
any specified time period or ever attempt conciliation, it would seem
to follow that the courts should hold that the EEOC's failure to serve
a copy of the charge on respondents does not affect the charging
party's substantive rights.
b. Persons who need to be named in the EEOC charge
A requirement that is well settled and very dangerous for the plaintiff
is that the plaintiff may sue only the respondent named in the EEOC
charge. 7 The underlying reason for this requirement is that the policy
of Title VII is to give the EEOC an opportunity to conciliate the
dispute.78 The EEOC can only conciliate with those named in the
charge; to allow others to be subsequently sued would be to allow the
plaintiff to bypass the EEOC. The thrust of this rule has a dual effect
on the plaintiff. First he may be precluded from suing someone he
neglected to charge; but if the person he neglected to name in the
charge is an indispensable party, his failure to name that person in the
charge will preclude him from suing someone he has named. Therefore,
an action against a district union has been dismissed because the locals
within the district were necessary parties and were not named in the
charge.79 A suit against an employer has been dismissed because the
notification that they have had the charge for 60 days and have been unable to conciliate the
dispute. See. e.g., Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969); Dent v. St. Louis
S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th
Cir. 1968); Logan v. General Fireproofing Co., - F. Supp. - , 2 FEP Cases 107 (W.D.
N.C. 1969).
75. IBEW Local 5 v. EEOC, 398 F.2d 248 (3rd Cir. 1968); Kemp v. General Elec. Co.,
F. Supp. - , 71 LRRM 2020 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Logan v, General Fireproofing Co., -
F. Supp. -, 2 FEP Cases 107 (W.D. N.C. 1969); Pullen v. Otis Elevator Co., 292 F. Supp.
715 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
76. See cases cited supra note 42.
77. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Mickel v. South Carolina
State Employment Serv., 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1967); Green v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp.. 299
F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mo. 1969); Edmonson v. Wackenhut Corp.. - F. Supp. -, 2 FEP
Cases 39 (M.D. Fla. 1968); Mondy v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 271 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. La. 1967).
78. Miller v. Int'l Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Freese v. John Morrell & Co.,
F. Supp..-, 70 LRRM 2924 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
79. Local 329, ILA v. South Atlantic District, ILA 295 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
See also Spell v. Local 77, IATSE, - F. Supp. -, 71 LRRM 2811 (D. N.J. 1969) where
the court held that an International Union was a necessary party in a suit brought against a Local
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union was an indispensable party under Rule 19 and could not be
joined because it was not named in the EEOC charge.80
One way to avoid a dismissal for improper joinder as described
supra is to argue that the party not named is either the principal or
agent of the party that was named. Naming the agent, for instance,
created an opportunity for conciliation that necessarily affects the
principal. This solution has been recognized in several cases but has
only been successful in two.82
3. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
The courts have had to grapple with the problem of the degree of
specificity required in Title VII actions to satisfy the requirement of
Rule 8(a)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that the complaint
contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." As has been noted above, the only trend
in most of the issues that have arisen under Title VII is that the courts
are in conflict. This issue is no exception. It is, therefore, difficult to
know what specificity will be required in the plaintiffs complaint.
In Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp.s3 the court
dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
because the plaintiff did not plead sufficient factual allegations of
specific unlawful employment practices to satisfy the requirements of
Rule 8(a)(2). Plaintiff had pleaded that she had been discriminated
against because of her race (1) in being assigned to dangerous work and
(2) by harassing supervisory techniques. The court found that these
allegations were mere conclusions and Rule 8(a)(2) could be satisfied
only by a "factual summary" of the alleged unlawful employment
practices sufficient to give "fair notice to the opposite party of the
precise nature of the claim."' Other courts have followed the reasoning
of the Edwards court in narrowly construing the requirement of Rule
Union to have the membership requirements changed. The court held that since the membership
requirement in question was in the International Union's bylaws, the International was a
necessary party. Fortunately for plaintiff, he had named the International Union in his charge to
the EEOC.
80. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co.. 301 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
81. Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Serv., 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1967);
Sokolowski v. Swift & Co., 286 F. Supp. 775 (D. Minn. 1968); Samuel v. Wannamaker. Inc..
- F. Supp. - 70 LRRM 2637 (D. S.C. 1968); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 271 F.
Supp. 27 (E.D. N.C. 1967).
82. McDonald v. Musicians - F. Supp. -. 2 FEP cases 365 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Taylor
v. Armco Steel Corp., - F. Supp.. 71 LRRM 2594 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
83. 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
84. Id. at 213.
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8(a)(2), at least when the plaintiff alleges that a pattern or practice of
discrimination exists.-
Some courts have refused to follow Edwards. In Grimm v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.,8 the court held that the requirements of
Rule 8(a)(2) were satisfied by a complaint that alleged that "on or
about Janurary 22, 1968, (sic) defendant willfully and intentionally
violated 42 USCA Section 2000e-2 (a)(1) .. .in that said defendant
did discharge plaintiff because of her sex ..... 87 The court in
Grimm specifically stated that the "requirement of Edwards that the
complaint contain a factual statement is therefore dictum at best and
if not dictum then error."8 Several other courts have followed this
more liberal construction of Rule 8(a)(2) in Title VII actions. 8
Similarly, courts have followed a very liberal rule of sufficiency in
motions for Summary Judgment for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.'
Although the trend in the federal courts has been toward
liberalizing pleading requirements,"' it is apparent from some of the
cases discussed supra that the Title VII plaintiff may not rely on liberal
pleading rules and, at least, must be aware of the risk he may run in
some jurisdictions by not pleading substantial facts which precisely
define the alleged unlawful employment practice.
4. SCOPE OF THE COMPLAINT
A very troublesome problem has been to decide what issues and
allegations the plaintiff may assert in his civil complaint. The general
rule is that the plaintiff may assert only those issues in his civil action
that were included in his EEOC charge. As is true with so many of
the problems that have arisen under Title VII, this rule is easier to state
than to apply. Courts that have ordered allegations struck from the
complaint because they were not raised in the EEOC charge justified
85. United States v. Gustin-Bacon Div., Certainteed Prods. Corp. 302 F. Supp. 759 (D.
Kans. 1969).
86. 300 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
87. Id. at 986.
88. Id. See 2A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1692 (1968).
89. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); Aiken v. New York Times,
- F. Supp. -, 2 FEP Cases 64 (S.D. N.Y. 1969) (sufficient to claim that plaintiff has been
denied a promotion because of his race); Everett v. Trans-World Airlines, F. Supp. -, 2
FEP Cases 74 (W.D. Mo. 1969); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 46 FRD 442 (N.D. Ga. 1968)
(must show that there is no set of facts that plaintiff could prove to entitle him to relief).
90. See. e.g., Ry. Employees v. Illinois Cent. R.R., - F. Supp. - , 2 FEP Cases 184
(N.D. i11. 1969). See also Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., - F. Supp. - , 70 LRRM 3043
(N.D. Ga. 1968).
91. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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the action because there can be no opportunity to conciliate claims that
were never made to the EEOC. They state that the allegations of the
suit must be the same as the allegations of the charge .
2
In King v. Georgia Power Co. the court recognized that:
It appears that a large number of the charges with EEOC are filed by ordinary
people unschooled in the technicalities of the Law. As stated in the brief filed
by EEOC: "to compel the charging party to specifically articulate in the charge
filed with the Commission, the full panoply of discrimination which he may have
suffered may cause the very persons Title VII was designed to protect to lose
that protection because they are ignorant of or unable to thoroughly describe the
discriminatory practices to which they are subjected
3
The King court adopted the rule that the scope of permissible issues
that may be tried in federal courts is "any . . . discrimination like or
reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of
such allegations during the -pendency of the case before the
Commission." In Burney v. North American Rockwell Corp.915 the
court adopted a similar test. That court held that all alleged acts of
discrimination of the same type and character as the discrimination
charged in the EEOC charge are permissible allegations in -a subsequent
civil action.
Essentially the two factors that need to be balanced are (1) the
desire not to defeat plaintiff's substantive rights by undue technicalities
and (2) the policy of the Act that the EEOC should be given a chance
to conciliate the dispute. The courts that allow all issues reasonably
related to issues in the charge to be sued upon seem to fulfill both
requirements. This broad test will not prey on the unwary layman who
files a charge with the EEOC. It also guarantees that the EEOC will
not be bypassed, for the EEOC attempts to conciliate not only the
charges alleged but also other practices reasonably related to the
alleged charge."
C. Summary
Before the plaintiff ever has a chance to argue the merits of his
complaint, he is besieged by a myriad of procedural hurdles and
92. See, e.g., Green v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 299 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mo. 1969);
Roberson v. Great American Ins. Cos., - F. Supp. -, 71 LRRM 2706 (N.D. Ga. 1969);
Allen v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., - F. Supp. -, 2 FEP Cases 20 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Edwards
v. North American Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
93. King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943, 946 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
94. Id.
95. 302 F. Supp. 86 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
96. Supra note 93 at 946, n.2.
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pitfalls. At the minimum, where the law is clear, he must ensure that
he avoids the obvious traps. More important, he must know where the
law is unsettled and be doubly careful to comply not only with the
literal meaning of the statute, but also with the sometimes harsh
interpretations of some courts. It is the thesis of this section that the
problems here discussed exist because, after almost five years, no
judicial consensus yet exists on the issue of whether the goals of the
Act are best solved by voluntary compliance or judicial coercion. The
plaintiffs attorney must recognize that this is the underlying issue,
because only then can he 1) begin to avoid some of the hazards and 2)
make persuasive arguments for a more liberal construction.
This section has attempted to (1) highlight the danger areas, (2)
indicate the trend of judicial throught where it has begun to emerge and
(3) where there seems to be no trend, suggest policy arguments
favorable to the plaintiff that may prove persuasive to uncommited
jurisdictions. Hopefully the plaintiffs counsel, being aware of the
procedural hazards, will proceed with caution and, where possible,
begin early in the administrative stage of the proceeding to avoid
procedural mistakes.
I II. REMEDIES
A. Appointment of Counsel and Attorney Fees
§ 706(e) authorizes the court to appoint an attorney for a plaintiff who
cannot afford to hire counsel and authorizes the court to allow the
plaintiff to proceed in formna pauperis. § 706(k) authorizes attorney
fees as an element of recovery. Although court appointment of counsel
and in forma pauperis petitions are clearly not "remedies" under the
Act, they are dealt with in this section because they are closely related
to recovery of counsel fees.
Very few cases have dealt with the issue of court appointment of
counsel in Title VII cases. The few that have, follow fairly consistent
criteria. First, the plaintiff's claim must appear meritorious. Therefore,
the court will not appoint counsel if the EEOC has found no probable
cause to believe an unlawful employment practice has taken place 
7
and where there has been no such adverse finding, one court has refused
to appoint counsel until the issues are joined in a civil action." This
procedure allows the court to determine the probable merit of the
97. Aiken v. New York Times, F. Supp. _ 2 FEP Cases 63 (S.D. N.Y. 1969);
Davis v. Boeing Co.. - F. Supp. -, 2 FEP Cases 62 (W.D. Wash. 1969).




claim. Query whether a destitute plaintiff could ever obtain court-
appointed counsel, if he must first show, in a civil action, after the
issues are joined, that his claim is meritorious?
The second precondition to court appointment of counsel is that
the plaintiff must establish that he has been unable to obtain counsel
by any other method, including, a contingency fee arrangement. 9 Since
the plaintiff has only thirty days to file a civil action from the time he
receives the EEOC "60 day letter", these requirements become
burdensome unless the court holds that the 30 day limitation period is
satisfied by the filing of the petition for court appointment of
counsel. 00 Nevertheless the two above stated requirements seem to
represent the trend of judicial thought on the subject.
There is a split of authority over the issue of when attorney fees
should be awarded as part of a plaintiff's recovery when the plaintiff
fails to prove his own allegation of discrimination, but is successful on
behalf of a class in enjoining a pattern or practice of discrimination.
One view is that the plaintiff is entitled to no attorney fees in such a
case.'0' The other view is that the plaintiff is entitled to that portion of
the attorney fees attributable to litigating the injunction of the pattern
or practice. 02 Where the plaintiff is successful in his own behalf, he
may be awarded, as part of costs, reasonable attorney fees according
to the guidelines established under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.'0
B. Injunctions
1. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
§ 707(a) specifically authorizes the United States Attorney General to
seek a preliminary injunction if he finds a pattern or practice of
discrimination. Nowhere in the Act, however, are private parties
specifically authorized to seek preliminary injunctions to enjoin alleged
acts of discrimination. Nevertheless, some courts have issued a
preliminary injunction as temporary individual relief.' 4 Where a
99. Poffer v. Cessna Aircraft Co., - F. Supp. - , 2 FEP Cases 304 (D. Kan. 1969);
Green v. Cotton Concentration Co., - F. Supp. - , 71 LRRM 3116 (S.D. Tex. 1968): In
Re Ramirez, 282 F. Supp. 663 (S.D. Tex. 1968). Cf. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d
I (5th Cir. 1969).
100. See cases cited supra note 43.
101. Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D. N.C. 1969).
102. Gunn v. Layne Bowler, Inc., - F. Supp. - , 69 LRRM 2237 (W.D. Tenn. 1967).
103. Dobbins v. Local 212, I BEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1969).
104. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., - F.2d - , 2 FEP Cases 377 (5th Cir. 1970);
State v. Baugh Const. Co., - F. Supp'. - , 2 FEP Cases 271 (W.D., Wash. 1969); Hicks v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., F. Supp. - , 70 LRRM 2223 (E.D. La. 1968). See also Pettway
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969); Local 53. Heat & Frost Insulators
v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
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preliminary injunction is sought as individual relief, the plaintiff must
act quickly to secure this injunction because it has been held that laches
on the part of a Title VII plaintiff is an adequate ground for denying
the injunction.""
A critically important issue when considering preliminary
injunctions is what needs to be shown to have a court issue a
preliminary injunction in class actions. The plaintiff must first make a
prima facie showing of a pattern or practice of discrimination.
Secondly, he must establish that irreparable damage will be done if the
motion is not granted, but there is authority that irreparable damage
will be presumed given a showing of a pattern or practice of
discrimination."", The plaintiffs counsel should therefore be aware of
the possibility of obtaining a preliminary injunction merely upon the
prima facie showing that a pattern or practice of discrimination
exists." 7
2. PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS
§ 706(g) specifically authorizes the court to enjoin the respondent from
engaging in unlawful employment practice and authorizes the court to
order such other affirmative action as may be appropriate. The courts
have interpreted this authorization to justify sweeping permanent
injunctions against respondents, especially labor unions, engaged in a
pattern or practice of discrimination."" The courts that have issued
sweeping, broad-based injunctions have based the authority to do so on
the premise that courts in Title VII actions have a duty to construe
broadly the grant of authority of § 706(g) and must use their
discretion and imagination to frame remedies that will ensure
compliance with the provisions of Title VII.1"I
105. Local 329, ILA v. South Atlantic District, ILA, 295 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
106. See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., - F.2d -, 2 FEP Cases 377 (5th Cir.
1970); U.S. v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969); Vogler v. McCarty, Inc.. 294
F. Supp. 368, 372 (E.D. La. 1967) affd407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
107. For cases allowing a preliminary injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, see State v.
Baugh Const. Co. - F. Supp. - , 2 FEP Cases 271 (W.D. Wash. 1969); Central Contractors
Assn. v. Local 46. IBEW, - F. Supp. - 2 FEP Cases 189 (W.D. Wash. 1969); Ethridge
v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967). For a case denying an injunction see. Arrington
v. Mass. Bay Trans. Auth.. - F. Supp. -, 2 FEP Cases 371 (D. Mass. 1969).
108. See. e.g.. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.
1969); United States v. Local 73. Plumbers. - F. Supp. - , 2 FEP Cases 81 (S.D. Ind.
1969); United States v. I BEW Local 38, __ F. Supp. - , 70 LRRM 3019 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
109. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Local 53, Heat & Frost
Insulators v. Vogler. 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); Clark v. American Marine Corp., 304 F.





Parties in Title VII actions have often requested a jury trial on the
issues of back pay under § 706(g). In the five decisions that have been
addressed to this question, back pay has been held an equitable remedy,
for which a jury trial is not required by the Act or by the Seventh
Amendment. " "
D. EEOC Enforcement Power
The courts have ruled on several occasions that the EEOC does not
have the power to initiate actions under Title VII. It does have the
authority under § 706(i), however, to insure compliance with an order
made by a district court in a private Title VII action by initiating
compliance suits in federal district courts. "'
E. Title VII As The Exclusive Remedy
1. POST CIVIL WAR CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES-
4 2 U.S.C. § 1981112
16 Stat. 144, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 [hereinafter cited as § 1981]
guarantees, among other things, the right of all persons to make and
enforce contracts to the same extent as white citizens. § 1981 has been
used to bring damage actions arising out of employment
discrimination. When the defendant has been an officer or agent of the
state or has acted under color of state law, the courts have had little
trouble applying § 1981 to authorize an action for damages and
injunctive relief."
1
The great question that remains unanswered is whether § 1981
can be used to redress private employment discrimination. Several
courts have answered this question in the negative either because they
have concluded that Title VII was intended to be the exclusive remedy
110. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969); Madlock
v. Sardis Luggage Co., - F. Supp. - 2 FEP Cases 304 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Cheatwood v.
Telephone Co., - F. Supp. - 70 LRRM 2679 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Hayes v. Seaboard Coast
Line R.R., 46 FRD 49 (S.D. Ga. 1968); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232
(N.D. Ga. 1968), rev. on other grounds, -. F.2d.-.2 FEP Cases 377 (5th Cir. 1970).
I 1. Rosen v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 409 F.2d 775 (3rd Cir. 1969); EEOC v.
Plumbers Local 189, - F. Supp. - 2 FEP Cases 170 (S.D. Ohio 1969); Local 186, Paper
Workers v. Minn. Mining& Mfg. Co.. - F. Supp... 71 LRRM 2427 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
112. For equal employment cases arising under Act Apr. 20, 1871. c. 22 § I. 17 Stat. 13;
42 U.S.C. 1983 (1964). See Madison v. Wood. 410 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1969); Lucia v. Duggan.
303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969); Porcelli v. Titus, 302 F. Supp. 726, (D. N.J. 1969). and under
Acts, July 31, 1861 C.33, 12 Stat. 284; Apr. 20, 1871 C.22 § 2, 17 Stat. 13. 42 U.S.C. 1985
(1964), see Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc.. 375 F.2d. 629 (5th Cir. 1967).
113. Ethridge v. Rhodes. 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
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for employment discrimination"4 or because § 1981 is based on the
14th Amendment and therefore only applies to "state action"."5 Some
courts have denied recovery under § 1981 for both of the above-stated.
reasons."' Two courts have permitted recovery under § 1981 to redress
private employment discrimination." 7 These decisions follow the
reasoning of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co." 8 that the post-civil-war
civil rights statutes (of which 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is one) are based on
rights protected by the 13th Amendment. Therefore, certain private
discrimination is prohibited by the Acts. The Mayer case is a 1968
case. The question raised but not answered in Clark v. American
Marine Corp."9 is whether employment discrimination that occurred
prior to 1968 can be remedied by application of § 1981. In other
words, if the Mayer case is extended to apply to § 1981, will it be
applied retroactively to employment discrimination that occurred prior
to 1968?
Application of the post-civil-war civil rights statutes to redress
private discrimination is still in the developing stages. The plaintiff's
counsel should be aware of the potential usefulness of § 1981, but also
must be aware of the lack of acceptance it has received in some private
employment discrimination cases.
2. EXECUTIVE ORDERS
One of the few rules in the area of employment discrimination that is
well settled is the effect of Presidential Executive Orders prohibiting
racial discrimination in employment by government contractors. The
rule is clear that these executive orders do not create a private remedy
to redress employment discrimination. Enforcement is delegated to
administrative agencies under procedures outline in the Order.'20
114. Roberson v. Great American Ins. Co., - F. Supp. _ 71 LRRM 2706 (N.D.
Ga. 1969). See also Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964).
115. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co.. 301 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Ill.
1969); Colbert v. H-K Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Waters v. Paschen Contractors.
Inc., 227 F. Supp. 659 (N.D. IlI. 1964); Kendrick v. American Bakery Co., - F. Supp. -.
69 LRRM 2012 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (dictum).
116. Harrison v. American Can Co..__ F. Supp. -. 2 FEP Cases I (S.D. Ala. 1969).
117. Clark v. American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1969); Central
Contractors Assn. v. Local 46, IBEW, - F. Supp. -, 2 FEP Cases 189 (W.D. Wash. 1969).
See also Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968) (dictum).
118. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). This case dealt with private discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
119. 304 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1969).
120. Gnotia v. United States, - F.2d -, 2 FEP Cases 111 (8th Cir. 1969); See Farkas
v. Texas Instrument. Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967); Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.. 329
F.2d 3 (3rd Cir. 1964).
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3. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
In sharp contrast to the settled state of the law on the question of the
effect of Presidential Executive Orders is the state of the law on the
question of the effect of Title VII on court enforcement of
nondiscrimination rights guaranteed under Federal Labor Relations
Acts. It has been held that one must exhaust his Title VII remedy
before suing the employer and union under § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement.12' It has also been held that Title VII
and the Railroad Labor Act are independent of one another and the
redress of rights guaranteed by one does not depend on exhaustion of
rights under the other. 22 It has been held that allegations of failure of
a union's duty of fair representation is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board, and therefore a member may
not seek to remedy the union's discrimination against him through
Title VII .' Exactly the opposite has also been held. 2 ,
It would be futile indeed to attempt to discover the prevailing view
regarding the effect of Title VI I. on other Federal Labor Laws. It is
suggested that the better view is to allow each to exist independent of
the other. This gives the empl9yee the maximum opportunity to redress
an alleged act of discrimination. With so many procedural traps under
Title VII, the chance of having one's claim dismissed is substantial. It
is in the public interest, therefore, to allow several possible avenues of
redress to (1) mitigate the harshness of a procedural dismissal under
Title VII and (2) ensure that no equal employment right created by one
statute becomes illusory because of another statute, designed to extend
equal employment opportunity. To give a naarrow effect to an equal
employment statute would be to injure the very people the statutes are
designed to help.
Roger C. Hartley
121. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 301 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
122. Norman v. Missouri Pac. R.R.. 414 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1969); Ry. Employees v. Illinois
Cent. R.R.. - F.Supp. -. 2 FEP Cases 184 (N.D. I1. 1969); Vogel v. Trans World Airlines
- F. Supp. - 2 FEP Cases 297 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
123. Freese v. John Morrell & Co.. - F. Supp.-, 70 LRRM 2924 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
124. Moreman v. Georgia Power Co.. - F. Supp. . 70 LRRM 3112 (N.D. Ga.
1969); Sokolowski v. Swift & Co., 286 F. Supp. 775 (D. Minn. 1968).
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